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REGIONAL PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AS
ENTREPRENEURIAL BRICOLAGE
John F. McArdle*

ABSTRACT:
Entrepreneurial development of contaminated or blighted land, commonly referred
to as “brownfield,” carries significant enterprise risk. When considering competing
opportunities, capital tends to flow in an adverse direction from higher-risk activity
where outcomes are less certain. In addition, a complicated regulatory landscape
can increase transaction costs which further limit the desirability of these projects.
Often, that leaves the remediation of environmentally compromised property in the
hands of the public sector. Yet, in industrialized nations with significant brownfield
presence, government is often unable to solely cure defects due to limited fiscal
resources and competing policy imperatives. One solution to the problem is to
employ a public/private redevelopment partnership along with corollary legal
remedies to incentivize brownfield redevelopment, minimize transaction costs, and
limit enterprise risk exposure.
KEY WORDS: Brownfield, Urban Revitalization, Entrepreneurship, Chelsea
Massachusetts, Marseille France, Euroméditerranée, Regional Development.
I. INTRODUCTION
The nature of entrepreneurial ventures involves a substantial amount of risk
taking on the part of any potential venture developer. This is particularly true in
the context of capital-intensive land development that requires the commitment of
significant financial resources from an entrepreneur. Land is, by definition, a finite
economic resource “subject to competing pressures from urbanization,
infrastructure, increased food, feed, fibre and fuel production and the provision of
key ecosystem services.” 1 Often, land acquisition and related transaction costs are
a substantial barrier to the financing and success of a venture, especially when soil
contamination might be a possibility. The presence of environmentally
contaminated and compromised land, particularly in urban areas, can have a
dilatory effect on moving regional economic development and revitalization efforts
* Assistant Professor of Management, Bertolon School of Business and Director, Center for
Entrepreneurship, Salem State University.
1
European Commission (2016). LAND AS A RESOURCE.
Retrieved from:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/land_use/index_en.htm.
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forward. These in turn can have a number of negative socio-economic impacts.
Blighted land negatively impacts property values and disincentivizes investment in
often already depressed neighborhoods and communities. It adds to social
problems, discourages renovation and maintenance of existing properties, and leads
to further deterioration and decay. Remediation costs can be difficult to assess or
quantify for the redevelopment of environmentally compromised, or “brownfield,”
sites. In regimes that assess liability for land pollution to any and all owners who
fall within the chain of responsibility for a given property, the mechanisms for
guarding against liability exposure are limited, and the economic and legal risks
associated with that development are often a high bar to a project moving forward.
Accordingly, capital often seeks less risk-loaded investments with a higher
likelihood of successful returns, leaving brownfield sites as a less attractive
investment relative to investments with lower barriers to entry.
The purpose of this article is to suggest policy schemes that might reduce
transaction costs for and minimize enterprise risk associated with brownfield
redevelopment projects through (1) the use of a public/private partnership to
acquire and remediate contaminated properties and (2) the adoption of regulatory
and policy frameworks for assessing and apportioning liability for environmental
damages that reward participation in same. First, it offers a brief discussion of
socio-economic impacts stemming from environmentally contaminated land. It
then makes the case for considering land development an entrepreneurial activity
and discusses some basic tenets of entrepreneurship. Next, it defines the term
brownfield and discusses considerations associated with the redevelopment of
environmentally contaminated land. Further, it provides a context for considering
the economic, social, and political rationales for incentivizing private sector
remediation of those sites. Then, it considers differences in the regulatory schemes
governing remediation of environmentally contaminated land of the United States
and the European Union (E.U.), with particular attention paid to the frameworks of
several E.U. member states. In addition, it advances an emerging argument for
incentivizing redevelopment of brownfield sites through legal policy frameworks
encouraging public/private partnerships to prompt action and the encouragement of
covenants not to sue and other legal remedies to minimize enterprise risk. Finally,
it discusses two innovative regional public/private partnerships – one from Chelsea,
Massachusetts, and the other from Marseille, France, and explores whether the use
of similar vehicles to spur entrepreneurial economic development of brownfield
sites might be a possible and attractive public policy goal.
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY CONTAMINATED LAND
AND THE INSUFFICIENCY OF A SOLELY PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
The presence of environmentally compromised land has a negative effect
on regional quality of life, property values, and economic development. 2 It has
severe repercussions across communities. Studies have estimated that public
disclosure of brownfield property on a register or database has a significant impact
on private investment within a region. 3 Brownfields have social, economic, and
health consequences.
In the absence of firms taking responsibility for the externalities created by
their profit-seeking activity, government has a responsibility to act on behalf of
regional communities to minimize negative consequences associated with those
activities. One way of framing this imperative is to consider the broken windows
metaphor 4 developed to support community policing. In that theoretical
framework, physical disorder emanating from vacant buildings, broken windows,
accumulated debris, graffiti, and blight, etc. leads to more significant social harms
in the form of social disorder and higher crime rates. In that formula, government
has a responsibility to act aggressively to limit the impacts ‘broken windows’ can
have on communities. 5 Applied in the context of regional economic development,
the presence of broken windows and other indicators of blight and decay on
neighborhood properties reduces incentives for investment by the private sector and
increases risk and transaction costs among those who might invest. Lack of
remediation of these sites results in two major problems. First, limited tax revenue
derived from these sites impacts the ability of government to provide and fund
essential services and leads to higher levels of inequity imposed on the remaining
tax base. Second, lack of remediation drives down the economic value of
contiguous properties. Those properties that become marginal operations due to
the negative impacts associated with blighted property are more likely to decline in
value. The cumulative effect of these conditions is an overall negative trend in the
economic health of a region and a shrinking tax base. Therefore, the public sector
has both a moral duty and an economic incentive to act on behalf of the region to
2

Christopher A. De Sousa, Changshan Wu, and Lynne M. Westphal. Assessing the Effect of
Publicly Assisted Brownfield Redevelopment on Surrounding Property Values. ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT QUARTERLY, 23:2, 95-110. (2009).
3
H.C. Jenkins-Smith, C.L. Silva, R.P. Berrens, and A. Bohara. Information Disclosure
Requirements and the Effect of Soil Contamination on Property Values. JOURNAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT. 45:3, 323-339. (2002).
4
J.Q. Wilson, & G. Kelling. The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows. ATLANTIC
MONTHLY. 127, 29-38. (1982).
5
Id.
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maximize economic value and foster conditions for economic development.
However, the costs of remediating brownfield property and other urban
blight are simply too large for public sector resolution alone. In a 2004 study, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated the cost to clean up brownfield
sites to be upward of $209 Billion. 6 Given the number of competing policy
obligations that governments need to address, it is unlikely that governments will
be able to solely bear the economic cost of that activity. In addition, the presence
of competing private rights of property and interests associated with the public good
make a defining line as to who bears responsibility to act hard to locate.
If, then, the public sector cannot do it alone, should the problem be left for
the private sector to address? That response is equally unsatisfactory. In a free
market system, private capital does not have a responsibility to invest in correcting
negative economic and social effects resulting from activity it does not have a
causal relationship with. Private investment is often difficult to attract in
communities where blighted property exists. To encourage and attract private
capital to invest in ‘social goods,’ government needs to create incentives for that
investment. However, given the nature of land development as a speculative and
entrepreneurial venture the typical model of tax abatement/exemption strategies,
grants, and government backed loans employed to attract private sector investment
in regional economic development is often insufficient to spur that investment.
That is largely due to the nature of how land entrepreneurs acquire and deploy
capital.
B. THE CASE
ACTIVITY

FOR

CONSIDERING LAND DEVELOPMENT

AS

ENTREPRENEURIAL

Land is a generally finite economic asset subject to competing uses with a
limited supply constrained by geographic, economic, and political factors. 7
Redevelopment of land in urban areas is fraught with significant amounts of
economic risk as, unlike other forms of economic activity, land development is
acutely impacted by the condition of other investments in close geographic
proximity. 8 Just as neglecting broken windows impacts a neighborhood and fosters
negative spillover effects, failing to clean up blighted property can have similar

6

United States Environmental Protection Agency. CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES:
MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS. (2004).
7

Klaus Hubacek and Jeroen van den Bergh. Changing Concepts of 'Land' in Economic Theory:
From Single to Multi-disciplinary Approaches. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS. 56:1, 5-27. (2006).
8
Richard B. Peiser. Risk Analysis in Land Development. REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS 12, 12–29.
(1984).
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results.
The development of any parcel of land involves the assumption of a high
degree of risk relating to the allocation and deployment of significant capital assets
to an activity that is long-term and largely difficult to reverse. Once you build
something, you cannot simply unbuild it. This type of activity is often undertaken
by an actor who (1) engages in projects involving risk where the outcome is
uncertain; (2) assumes the risk associated with that uncertainty; (3) supplies
financial capital; (4) allocates resources among alternative uses; and, (5) is an alert
discoverer or seeker of opportunities. All of these attributes apply to land investors,
and all fit classical definitions of entrepreneurship. 9 By definition, then, any
investor in land development is an entrepreneur.
Regardless of industry, entrepreneurs must engage in a process of analyzing
any given opportunity through a lens that assesses anticipated costs, anticipated
risks, and the likelihood of achievement of anticipated outcomes. All of the above
assumes the creation of a product that has a quantifiable value and serves a
particular and identifiable market need. Entrepreneurs must consider the likelihood
of receiving an acceptable return on a given investment, and they must weigh the
attractiveness of one decision opportunity relative to other decision opportunities.
In doing so, one question an entrepreneur should ask is whether, when measured
against other possible alternative uses for limited resources, an opportunity has a
reasonable likelihood of success.
When conducting that assessment, one important consideration for an
entrepreneur is the assessment of any given risks associated with a proposed
activity. Land speculation is inherently risky, and all property development is on
some level speculative. This is due to factors such as the long-term nature of land
speculation, the requirement to allocate and commit significant amounts of capital
to that activity for an extended period of time, and the uncertainty associated with
economic valuation of any land development given a host of uncontrollable external
factors. Developers frequently hedge against risk through a variety of mechanisms
including insurance, leverage, and syndication or joint venture. Indeed, employing
those strategies in the creation of a profit-seeking new venture might trigger
fiduciary responsibility on the part of a developer toward partners and other
investors. That developer might, for example, be obliged to seek the most
reasonable return on investment when considering risk, likelihood of success, and
time to recover investment as some of the primary considerations, which would
make higher-risk projects less attractive. In any speculative land investment, there
is generally an element of bricolage – recombining resources at hand or easily
9

For a deeper discussion of these attributes, see Paul Westhead and Mike Wright.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION. Oxford University Press. (2013).
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acquirable to accomplish a particular goal – and the above hedging strategies are
classic examples of bricolage. Bricolage is also a hallmark of entrepreneurship.
C. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF BROWNFIELD LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
In the United States, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA," often referred to as the
Superfund statute) imposes a strict, joint, and several liability regime at the federal
level on a responsible party for environmental contamination. CERCLA was
enacted as a mechanism for locating and recovering costs associated with
remediating land contamination to facilitate the remediation and reuse of underdeployed and undervalued economic assets. As land is finite, and environmentally
compromised land is often an unusable asset that has negative spillover effects on
a community or regional level, there is a strong public policy argument for the
creation of policy mechanisms to encourage remediation and reuse of that property
in a way that maximizes value and utility. The act allows for the retroactive
application of liability against any party in the chain of responsibility for
contamination with a limited array of available defenses. 10 CERCLA applies both
to properties deemed as “superfund” sites and to those defined as brownfields. To
be deemed a superfund site, a property must be determined to have been
contaminated by hazardous waste and identified by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) as a candidate for cleanup because it
poses a risk to human health and/or the environment. After classification, the site
is placed on the EPA’s National Priorities List (“NPL”). 11 Although not every
environmentally compromised site is classified as a superfund site, there are 1,852
properties currently on the NPL. 12 However, CERCLA has a broader mandate than
solely applying to superfund sites and imposes significant legal liability for the
remediation of a broader group of environmentally compromised land commonly
described as brownfields.
The term “brownfield” was originally a colloquialism coined to describe
previously developed land that was environmentally distressed and was contrasted
with “greenfield,” a land parcel free from environmental contamination that has not
been built upon. The EPA has since codified a definition of brownfield as “property,
the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the
10
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (2000).
11
Environmental Protection Agency. http://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-nationalpriorities-list-npl.
12
To search properties where you live, see http://www.epa.gov/superfund/search-superfundsites-where-you-live.
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presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant.” 13 The E.U. has no formal definition of brownfield. However, a
commonly used definition in Europe notes that brownfields are “sites that have
been affected by the former uses of the site and surrounding land; are derelict and
underused; may have real or perceived contamination problems; are mainly in
developed urban areas; and require intervention to bring them back to beneficial
use.” 14 In a French context, brownfield sites are referred to as friches industrielles
– literally translated as “industrial wasteland.”
Characteristics common to all definitions include a notion that brownfield
properties are likely to contain negative environmental risks associated with prior
industrial or commercial uses. Because the nature of land tenure involves
successive ownership of property over long periods of time, and the nature of
pollution often makes locating responsibility for contamination difficult,
jurisdictions have historically taken fragmented approaches to allocating
responsibility for environmental harms. The United States employs a broad policy
framework that casts a wide liability net, while in the European context, the trend
has been toward narrowing responsibility and following a ‘polluter pays’ approach.
CERCLA liability supersedes state and local legal frameworks and allows
for the application of retroactive liability for costs associated with environmental
contamination or improper remediation of properties deemed to be “superfund” or
brownfield sites. As a result, CERCLA exposure often serves as a disincentive for
private sector entrepreneurial development of environmentally compromised land
as the assessment of financial risk is often difficult to quantify or, in fact, is largely
unquantifiable. When an entrepreneur interested in land speculation considers the
enterprise risk associated with remediating a brownfield site, other less risky
alternatives comparatively look more attractive, particularly if time horizons for the
reasonable recovery of capital investments and/or fiduciary responsibilities are a
consideration. 15 As a result of entrepreneurs “passing” on risk-heavy brownfield
redevelopment opportunities given liability risks associated with that development,
despite the nearly four decades of the law’s existence, the number of superfund sites
in the United States is still quite large, and the number of brownfield sites even
larger. The EPA estimates that there are more than 450,000 brownfield sites in the

13

Environmental Protection Agency. OVERVIEW OF THE BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM.
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-brownfields-program.
14
World Bank. THE MANAGEMENT OF BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: A GUIDANCE NOTE.
(2010).
15
A. Alberini, A. Longo, S. Tonin, F. Trombetta, M. Turvani, The Role of Liability, Regulation
and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of
Developers. REG SCI URBAN ECON 35:327–351. (2005).
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United States. 16
In an effort to spur redevelopment of brownfield sites, Congress modified
CERCLA in 2002 by enacting the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act (commonly referred to as the Brownfields Act). 17 Among other
things, the modification created narrow classes of liability exemption and provided
some incentives to foster revitalization of brownfield sites. However, the results
have been mixed. 18
Legal constructs addressing the remediation and redevelopment of
environmentally compromised land are significantly different in the European
context, where the E.U. has yet to adopt a controlling international standard among
member states. The primary vehicle for addressing liability for environmentally
contaminated land in the E.U. is found in Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental
Liability (“ELD”), which applies a “polluter pays” standard of liability to an
operator. 19 Further, ELD limits that liability solely to activities within the control
of an operator and does not apply retroactive liability. 20 With the exception of the
ELD (which sets forth a broad policy mandate while allowing for different policy
schema amongst the member states), the E.U. does not have a broad policy
framework.
To avoid some of the remediation and redevelopment disincentives that
flow from the CERCLA statute, a number of European governments have enacted
legislative frameworks that restrict liability and/or provide incentives for
remediation of environmentally compromised soil. 21 The legislative frameworks
generally fall into two distinct categories: those jurisdictions that impose retroactive
16

Environmental Protection Agency. OVERVIEW OF THE BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM.
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-brownfields-program.
17
Pub. L. No. 107-118, Stat. 2306 (2002).
18
For an interesting review of the Brownfields Act, see Flannary P. Collins, The Small Business
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 303,
328 (2003).
19
As defined in the ELD, an operator is defined as “any natural or legal, private or public person
who operates or controls the occupational activity or…to whom decisive economic power over
the…activity has been delegated.” ELD, Article II, §6.
20
The preamble to the ELD states: “According to the ‘polluter pays’ principle, an operator
causing environmental damage or creating an imminent threat of such damage should, in principle,
bear the cost of the necessary preventative or remedial measures…” (ELD, at 18.) It goes on to state
that “an operator should not be required to bear the costs of preventive or remedial actions taken
pursuant to this Directive in situations where the damage in question or imminent threat thereof is
the result of certain events beyond the operator’s control.” (Id. at 20).
21
Anna Alberini, Alberto Longo, Stefania Tonin, Francesco Trombetta, Margherita Turvani,
The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and
Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of Developers, REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN
ECONOMICS. 35:4, 327-351. (2005).
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liability similar to the superfund framework, and those that adopt a “polluter-pays”
approach more in keeping with civil law traditions and the European Union’s policy
guidance. Many of the “polluter-pays” policy frameworks locate responsibility for
environmental cleanup to a sub-national or regional level, and most provide a
system of voluntary agreements and initiatives. 22
In France, management of brownfield or contaminated sites is a regional
activity, and there is no retroactive liability imposed on an entity that acquires a
brownfield site that had no relationship with the prior use. 23 Accordingly, cleanup
costs are difficult to allocate to responsible parties and are often borne by a
combination of government and interested private developer. 24
D. AN ARGUMENT FOR INCENTIVIZING PRIVATE SECTOR REDEVELOPMENT OF
BROWNFIELD SITES THROUGH LEGAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS
As stated above, government alone cannot solve the problem of remediating
and redeveloping environmentally contaminated sites. The transaction costs
associated with that remediation are too substantial for government to absorb given
a host of competing policy imperatives. However, statutory frameworks that
impose liability to on any responsible party for damages associated with owning,
using, or remediating brownfield sites with extremely narrow and limited
exceptions, serve as an effective deterrent for entrepreneurial activity in that sector,
harming everyone. While property acquisition values for brownfield property
might be lower than comparably situated greenfield property given the significant
costs associated with redevelopment, the economic risks associated with
remediation are often too great to justify investment. A form of “Handyman’s
special” logic does not apply, and the result is an oversupply of blighted properties
in a market with no interested buyers.
Under a polluter pays framework as employed in the ELD and in the French
context, liability for environmental remediation is limited to those activities solely
under the control of an operator, is proportional, and is not retroactive. As a result,
the enterprise risk calculation is different, but the acquisition and remediation costs
to develop a brownfield property might be a bar when projects are considered
relative to greenfield development. Similarly, in the United States, the CERCLA
22

Id.
Gareth Thornton, Martin Franz, David Edwards, Gernot Pahlen, Paul Nathanail, The
Challenge of Sustainability: Incentives for Brownfield Regeneration in Europe. ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCE & POLICY. 10:2, 116-134. (2007).
24
Lauren Andres, Levels of Governance and Multi-stage Policy Process of Brownfield
Regeneration: A Comparison of France and Switzerland. INTERNATIONAL PLANNING STUDIES.
17:1, 23-43. (2012).
23
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statute extends liability protection to five types of parties engaged in the acquisition
and remediation of a brownfield site, provided that they comply with a specific set
of regulatory requirements under CERCLA §101(40)(C-G) and §107(q).25
Arguably, in the U.S. context, the limited nature of those exceptions does not
encourage private purchase and redevelopment of a brownfield site unless the
economic costs and associated risks are quantifiable and manageable. Indeed, one
important consideration in that analysis is that while an innocent purchaser of a
brownfield site might be exempt from CERCLA liability, he will not be exempt
from the remediation costs associated with that property as CERCLA contains
windfall recovery provisions. 26
One method of managing such associated risks in a non-polluter pays
jurisdiction is for a private entity interested in developing a brownfield property to
(1) purchase that property after it has been remediated by an intermediate party who
agrees to assume the risk of remediation and become part of the chain of
responsibility and (2) do so after the issuance of covenants not to file suit and seek
damages for environmental problems from appropriate agencies at the sub-national
and national levels.
In the French context, the analysis of enterprise risk with regard to
brownfield liability is different given the statutory regime used to allocate
responsibility, but the economic calculus is similar – capital seeks similar return
conversant with lower risk, and the economic cost of remediation is a significant
bar to investment.
Accordingly, the use of a properly structured public/private partnership or
other intermediary agency to acquire and remediate contaminated brownfield sites
may be an effective way to reduce transaction costs and spur regional economic
development in both regulatory schemes. One successful example of such a
partnership in the United States is the redevelopment of the Box District in Chelsea,
Massachusetts, and another is the Euroméditerranée project established in Marseille
in 1995. 27 Both are models for how to effect brownfield redevelopment and spur

25

The five types of parties include:
• Innocent landowners, CERCLA §101(35)(A).
• Contiguous property owners, §107(q).
• Bona fide prospective purchasers, §§ 101(40) and 107(r).
• Units of state or local government that acquire ownership or control involuntarily through
bankruptcy, tax delinquency or abandonment, §101(20)(D).
• Government entities that acquire property through eminent domain, §101(35)(A)(ii).
26
For a broader discussion of this issue, see BROWNFIELDS, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd S. Davis & Scott A. Sherman, eds., 3d. ed. 2010).
27
For a comparative analysis of the two projects, see J. F. McArdle, (2018). 3P PARTNERSHIPS
AND NEIGHBORHOOD TRANSFORMATION. Manuscript in preparation.
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regional economic and social gains.
III. TWO SUCCESSFUL MODELS OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELD SITES.

FOR THE

A. THE BOX DISTRICT. CHELSEA, MASSACHUSETTS
Chelsea, Massachusetts, is a working class suburban gateway community
north of Boston. For most of the 20th Century, Chelsea had been the home to
numerous manufacturing and shipping companies. Many of these companies were
centered in any area of Chelsea known as the box district – largely comprised of
mattress and cardboard box manufacturing facilities.
The box district is a 10.5 acre parcel of land that has been extensively
redeveloped as a result of a three-party, public-private partnership between the city
of Chelsea, a local non-profit developer, and a for-profit land development
company. Redevelopment of the site has resulted in 248 mixed-income housing
units, a multi-modal public transit stop, and a million dollar public access park. The
entire project was valued at over $70 million and took approximately 10 years to
complete. 28
Development of the site occurred after the property languished for years.
There was a lack of interest on the part of private development companies to
speculatively engage in site remediation and investment to produce housing units
that might not be profitable. In 2004, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
modified zoning laws to incentivize development of mixed income housing units
under a program known as 40R. The 40R program was intended to encourage
adaptive reuse of development sites to create affordable housing in transit-rich
neighborhoods. Working with a local nonprofit redevelopment agency, the city of
Chelsea was able to attract private development of the site through a mix of
streamlined financing and acquisition strategies of properties within the zone, as
well as fast-tracked building regulations and approvals. Local control of zoning
regulations and strong working relationships between city, state, and federal
officials allowed for clearance of many of the administrative hurdles that typically
preclude private developers from engaging in complicated brownfield
redevelopment projects.
Employing the above approach housed within a public-private partnership,
reduced the enterprise risk often associated with projects of this type and allowed
for a private developer to commit resources that otherwise might have been
28

For greater detail, see Archana Pyati. CHELSEA’S BOX DISTRICT DEMONSTRATES THE POWER OF
HIGH-QUALITY AFFORDABLE HOUSING TO ATTRACT MARKET-RATE DEVELOPMENT. Urban Land
Institute. (2016).
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deployed elsewhere. The partnership was able to leverage a significant amount of
federal and state grant monies to clear the financial barriers to entry that otherwise
exist for a private developer. By further negotiating the development of an
intermodal transportation hub within the development, the partnership was able to
create regional neighborhood conditions that made the site much more attractive
for residential use. The project has also resulted in spillover effects in the local
community, including coordination with a number of workforce and community
development organizations that have been able to achieve strong economies of scale
to strengthen the community.
B. EUROMÉDITERRANÉE. MARSEILLE, FRANCE.
At 480 hectares (1186 acres), the project covers almost 75% of the total
area of the city of Marseille. It is the largest urban redevelopment project in
southern Europe. While significantly larger in scale than the Box District project,
Euroméditerranée shares some similar characteristics with its American
counterpart.
The project began in 1995 as a partnership between the French national
government and several regional governments to renovate a blighted urban district
between the historic port, the commercial harbor, and the TGV rail station.
Marseille is a gateway city for immigration into southern Europe, and the district
had historically been seen as crime-ridden and rife with a number of social issues.
With over two decades of history, Euroméditerranée is an unparalleled
success. The project has impacted 40,000 residents and created 35,000 jobs. A 7.5
billion euro investment has resulted in 1 million m2 of office space, 24,000 housing
units, and 200,000 m2 of public facilities. Those facilities include 150 acres of parks
and public spaces as well as 3 miles of waterfront promenade. Every euro of public
investment has been matched by 5 euros of direct private investment. 29 Rather than
working with an individual private development partner, Euroméditerranée has
been successful by employing a strategy of acquiring, remediating, and transferring
clean brownfield land post-remediation to private developers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both of the above examples are successful models of public/private
brownfield redevelopment partnerships able to limit developer liability, incentivize
private investment in adapting brownfield sites, and reduce transaction costs
29

For a comprehensive overview of the Euroméditerranée project timeline and impact, see
http://www.euromediterranee.fr/districts/introduction.html?L=1.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol2/iss1/5
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associated with site redevelopment. This type of approach works in multiple policy
regimes, can be deployed at various points of scale, and allows both the public and
private sectors to employ leverage that amplifies the impact of their investments.
As regions weigh the question of what to do with blighted properties within
their borders, they would do well to consider the formation of public/private land
redevelopment partnerships as a vehicle for success.
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